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Depressed (n=20) and nondepressed (n=24) subjects' 
memory for affectively valenced words was assessed with 
either an explicit test (cued recall) or with an implicit 
test (word fragment completion). Memory cues were held 
constant across these test conditions. Under cued recall 
instructions, depressed subjects recalled significantly more 
negatively toned than positively toned words, whereas the 
opposite pattern was observed in nondepressed controls. The 
differential effect of word valence was absent, however, 
when memory was tested implicitly, as depressed and 
nondepressed subjects exhibited equivalent priming of 
positive and negative words. These data are consistent with 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews1 (1988) model of 
depression. 
Subjects in the fragment completion condition were also 
given a recognition test. Performance was expected to mirror 
that in cued recall; however, this hypothesis was not 
supported. Instead, depressed subjects provided 
significantly fewer responses overall than did nondepressed 
subjects. Further, depressed subjects were significantly 
less likely to produce false alarms to positive than to 
negative items. Possible reasons for these results are 
discussed. 
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The last several decades have witnesssed a burgeoning 
empirical interest in cognitive deficits associated with 
various psychopathological states. Perhaps nowhere has this 
been more apparent than in the study of depressive disorders 
as numerous investigations have examined memory functioning 
in depression. Johnson and Magaro (1987) and Blaney (1986) 
provide excellent reviews of the literature in this area. 
Of particular relevance to the present discussion are 
empirical investigations that have measured depressives' 
memory for affectively laden materials. In general, these 
studies have relied on a traditional test of memory such as 
free recall. A key feature of this kind of test is that 
explicit reference is made to some prior learning 
experience; and, therefore, conscious recollection is 
measured. For example, in a typical experimental paradigm, 
Derry and Kuiper (1981) asked clinically depressed, 
psychiatric control, and normal control subjects to provide 
self-referent (does it describe you?), semantic (does it 
mean the same as a given word?) , or structural (does it have 
small letters?) judgments for a series of depressed- and 
nondepressed-content adjectives. Immediately following the 
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judgment task, subjects were given an incidental free recall 
test. Although no within-group differences were observed 
for words receiving structural or semantic judgments, 
differences emerged for words receiving self-reference 
judgments. Depressed subjects evidenced superior recall of 
self-referenced, depressed-content adjectives relative to 
the nondepressed-content adjectives. Conversely, 
nondepressed psychiatric control and normal control subjects 
evidenced superior recall for self-referenced, nondepressed-
content adjectives. The finding that depressives tend to 
show biased recall of negative material while normal control 
subjects tend to show biased recall of positive material has 
been replicated in a number of studies utilizing traditional 
tests of memory (Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Breslow, Kocsis, 
& Belkin, 1981; Mathews & Bradley, 1983; McDowell, 1984). 
These data appear quite consistent with Beck's well-
known model of depression (Beck, 1967; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1979; Kovacs & Beck, 1978). In his model, Beck 
proposes that depression involves the activation of latent, 
negatively valenced schemata. These schemata, or knowledge 
structures, influence the screening, encoding, and 
organization of incoming information. Although by their 
very nature schemata are inherently idiosyncratic, Beck 
suggests that depressive schemata share several common 
characteristics. Specifically, Beck posits that these 
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schemata contain negative beliefs about the self, the world, 
and the future. Because negative material is consistent 
with depressives' current thought processes, richly encoded 
memory traces result. Thus, from this perspective, 
negatively biased recall would be expected. 
Recently, experimental paradigms have been developed 
that allow memory for information to be assessed indirectly. 
Unlike in traditional experimental paradigms, subjects are 
not asked to recall information; rather, after a study 
phase, they are asked instead to perform a task such as word 
fragment completion or stem completion. Memory for 
information presented in the study phase is measured by 
comparing performance on those items to performance on new 
items. This facilitation in performance has been labeled 
direct or repetition priming (e.g., Cofer, 1967) . In 
contrast to traditional tests believed to measure "explicit" 
memory, these latter kinds of tasks are thought to measure 
"implicit" memory, descriptive labels suggested by Graf and 
Schacter (1985). 
In the field of cognitive psychology, research has 
demonstrated notable performance dissociations when explicit 
and implicit measures were employed. In other words, a 
variable may affect performance on an explicit test, and yet 
exert no apparent influence on performance on an implicit 
test. For example, in a typical experiment, Jacoby and 
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Dallas (1981) asked college students to provide either 
semantic or structural judgments about a series of familiar 
words, a standard levels of processing manipulation. 
Following the incidental study phase, memory was assessed by 
both yes/no recognition, an explicit test, and perceptual 
identification, an implicit test. In both test conditions 
performance was enhanced, which indicates the effects of 
prior experience. However, as expected on the basis of 
numerous previous experiments involving levels of processing 
manipulations (e.g., Craik & Tulving, 1975), recognition 
performance was higher following semantic judgments than 
structural judgments. Presumably, performance was enhanced 
for items receiving semantic judgments because relative to 
the structural task, this type of judgment task induced more 
elaborative encoding. In contrast, although priming effects 
were observed, performance on perceptual identification was 
not affected differentially by type of study task. 
The null effect of levels of processing on implicit 
measures has been replicated in a number of studies 
utilizing a variety of implicit measures (e.g. Graf & 
Mandler, 1984; Graf, Mandler, & Haden, 1982; Kirsner, 
Milech, & Standen, 1983, Expt. 2 & 3). Taken together, 
these results indicate that implicit memory, unlike explicit 
memory, is not enhanced by study tasks that induce 
elaborative processing, although effects of prior experience 
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are clearly apparent. These findings are pertinent to the 
issue of depressives' memory for affectively valenced 
material. 
When examining depressives' memory for affectively 
neutral material, recent research has also demonstrated 
striking dissociations between explicit and implicit 
measures. For example, Hertel and Hardin (1990) reported 
dissociations in performance on implicit and explicit tests 
as a function of induced depressed mood. These authors 
reported that deficits on an explicit measure (recognition) 
occurred following depressive induction while performance on 
an implicit measure (spelling homophones) was not affected 
by the mood induction procedure. Similarly, Danion, 
Willard-Schoeder, Zimmerman, Grange, Schlienger, and Singer 
(1991) reported that compared to that of normal controls, 
the performance of clinically depressed subjects was 
severely impaired on a test of explicit memory (free 
recall), whereas performance on an implicit test (stem 
completion) was equivalent across the two groups. In both 
of these cases, the explicit/implicit nature of the test 
appeared to be a critical factor when assessing memory 
functioning. 
The aforementioned studies utilized affectively neutral 
material when comparing depressives' performance on explicit 
and implicit tests. The central focus of the present study, 
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however, involved the question of differential effects of 
affectively laden material when explicit versus implicit 
memory tests were employed. It has been shown that Beck's 
model of depression can easily account for the observed 
tendency towards enhanced memory for negative material when 
explicit measures are employed. In contrast, it is 
exceedingly difficult to derive unambiguous predictions from 
his theory regarding the effects of affective valence on 
implicit memory tests. On the one hand, Beck clearly argues 
that self-schema congruent information receives greater 
elaborative processing than incongruent information, a 
position that may be thought of as the "facilitation" 
version of his theory. On the other hand, at times, Beck 
appears to assign an even stronger role to schemata, arguing 
that self-schemata may effectively filter or screen out 
incongruent information, a position that may be thought of 
as the "filtering" version of his theory. These two 
positions result in identical predictions regarding explicit 
memory, but yield diametrically opposing predictions 
regarding implicit memory performance. 
Beck's first argument would suggest that no implicit 
memory bias will occur as a function of affective valence. 
Recall that research with normal subjects has indicated that 
implicit memory, unlike explicit memory, is not enhanced by 
study tasks that induce elaborative processing. Thus, 
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although negative material receives greater elaboration by 
depressives than positive material, this elaboration should 
not enhance performance on an implicit memory test. In 
contrast, Beck's second argument, the "filtering" version, 
would suggest that a negative bias will be apparent when 
employing implicit as well as explicit measures. If self-
schema incongruent information is not processed at all, or 
in other words, is preattentively filtered, then a negative 
bias would be expected in implicit memory. As Williams, 
Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews (1988, Chapter 10) have pointed 
out, Beck's theory is unclear on the question of where in 
the processing chain affectively biased processing occurs. 
However, a theoretical model put forth by Williams and his 
colleagues does clearly specify the location of biased 
processing. Because the model developed by these authors 
allows straightforward predictions to be made concerning the 
effects of affective valence on implicit memory, a brief 
overview of their ideas is presented. 
Williams et al. put forth an integrative model intended 
to explain cognitive aspects of depression and anxiety. 
These authors argue that different pathological mood states 
(i.e., depression versus anxiety) exert effects on different 
components in the information processing sequence. In their 
model, it is proposed that both encoding processes and 
retrieval processes involve an automatic component and an 
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active strategic component, a proposition consistent with 
more general theories of memory and cognition (e.g., Hasher 
& Zacks, 1979; Jacoby & Hollingshead, 1990; Schneider & 
Shiffrin, 1977) . 
At the encoding stage, it is assumed that a number of 
cognitive operations may occur preattentively. Williams et 
al. further assume that, at this level of processing, a 
decision mechanism exists that is capable of assessing 
incoming information on affective dimensions and orienting 
attentional resources toward or away from that information. 
In pathological states of anxiety, Williams et al. propose 
that resources are oriented towards the location of 
threatening stimuli. This hypothesis is consistent with 
data showing that incidentally presented threat words 
interfere with anxious subjects' performance on other tasks 
such as visual probe detection (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1986). 
In contrast, attentional biases of this sort do not 
appear to be strongly associated with depression. For 
instance, in the aforementioned study carried out by MacLeod 
et al., incidental presentation of depressed content words 
did not interfere with depressives' performance on the 
visual probe task. Thus, Williams et al. hypothesize that 
in depression, the processing bias favoring negative 
material occurs after the preattentive stages of processing, 
9 
and instead influences elaboration of the information. In 
other words, they suggest that depressed individuals tend to 
react to the output from the preattentive decision mechanism 
at the elaboration stage. Because additional resources are 
deployed, negative material tends to be more elaboratively 
encoded. 
Williams et al. also suggest that retrieval from memory 
involves both an automatic, passive component and a 
strategic component that is consciously controlled. The 
automatic component determines which memories merely "come 
to mind," while the strategic component directs active 
memory searches. The preattentive stages of processing at 
encoding discussed above are thought sufficient to influence 
the automatic stage of retrieval, but strategic processes of 
retrieval are dependent upon elaborative processes at 
encoding. Again, the authors point out that some mood 
states may affect the passive component, while others affect 
the strategic component. Finally, Williams et al. suggest 
that explicit memory tests involve strategic retrieval, 
whereas implicit tests of memory can be accomplished by 
automatic processes. The suppositions put forth by these 
authors are certainly consistent with theory and data from 
studies examining explicit versus implicit memory in normal 
subjects (i.e., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & 
Hollingshead, 1990). 
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From the assumptions set out in the above theoretical 
model, one would predict that affective valence will produce 
a negative bias in recall but no effect on implicit memory 
of depressives. In a study by Denny and Hunt (1992), this 
prediction was tested. Clinically depressed female 
inpatients and nondepressed control subjects were presented 
with positively and negatively valenced words and asked to 
perform a self-reference rating task. Each subject then 
completed both a fragment completion test and a free recall 
test, given in balanced order. The experimental question 
concerned the effect of word valence as a function of type 
of test and subject group. The results indicated that under 
free recall instructions depressed subjects recalled 
significantly more negatively valenced than positively 
valenced words while the opposite pattern was observed in 
nondepressed control subjects. These results replicate 
those previously reported in the literature (Bradley & 
Mathews, 1983; Breslow, Kocsis, & Belkin, 1981; Derry & 
Kuiper, 1981; Mathews & Bradley, 1983; McDowell, 1984). 
When memory was tested implicitly, however, the differential 
effect of word valence was absent. That is, depressed and 
nondepressed subjects exhibited equivalent priming of 
positive and negative words. 
These results are consistent with predictions derived 
from Williams et al.'s model of depression. The null effect 
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of word valence when memory was measured indirectly suggests 
that for depressed and nondepressed individuals, positive 
and negative information is equally available. Furthermore, 
the negative bias observed for depressed subjects under free 
recall instructions supports the notion that unlike positive 
information, negative information receives deep or 
elaborative encoding thereby rendering this kind of 
information more accessible for conscious retrieval. Taken 
together, these data indicate that depressives1 encoding and 
retrieval processes are influenced by affective information; 
however, the notion that positive information is screened or 
filtered out at the encoding stage, as a "filtering" version 
of Beck's theory might suggest, is clearly unwarranted. 
Although these data are consistent with overall 
predictions derived from Williams et al.'s theory, they 
cannot speak unequivocally to the authors' speculation about 
the nature of thought processes in depression. In their 
theoretical model, Williams and his colleagues suggest that 
retrieval from memory involves both an automatic, passive 
stage of "coming to mind" and a consciously controlled, 
strategic stage. If one could assume that the critical 
variable affecting performance was the differing 
instructions, then one might conclude that strategic, 
controlled processes were responsible for the test 
dissociation reported by Denny and Hunt. Unfortunately, 
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such an assumption must be tentative because instructions 
were confounded with another potentially critical variable. 
In particular, cue support as well as instructions varied 
across memory task conditions. Unlike in the free recall 
condition, in the word fragment completion condition, 
subjects were given word fragments; these fragments could 
have functioned as cues to "bring information to mind." 
More specifically, it could be the case that positive words 
were less likely to "come to mind" than negative words for 
the depressed subjects in the free recall condition, whereas 
exposure to the fragments in the fragment completion 
condition served to increase the availability of the 
positive words. If indeed the fragments functioned in this 
manner, then the observed test dissociation should properly 
be ascribed to the automatic rather than the strategic 
processes of retrieval in Williams et al.1s theory. 
As previously mentioned, the ideas put forth by Williams 
et al. are consistent with more general notions about 
memory. Of particular relevance is the "generate/recognize" 
model recently proposed by Jacoby and Hollingshead (1990). 
In their model, two bases for memory decisions are 
postulated, generation and recognition. Generation is 
thought to underlie performance on indirect tests of memory 
such as stem or fragment completion, whereas performance on 
direct tests such as cued recall also includes recognition 
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processes. In terms of the dichotomy set forth by Williams 
at al. and others, generation may be thought of as an 
automatic process, and recognition, a strategic process. 
In a series of studies, Jacoby and Hollingshead garnered 
empirical support for a generate/recognize model of recall. 
In their work utilizing college students as subjects, 
interactions between test conditions and prior processing 
were successfully predicted by their model. For example, 
the probability of providing an "old" word was higher in a 
stem completion test condition than in a cued recall 
condition when target words were read earlier than when they 
were presented as anagrams to be solved. If one 
conceptualizes the read/anagram processing manipulation as 
similar to a levels of processing manipulation, these 
results are not surprising. The idea here is that words 
that were read, or shallowly processed, received less 
elaboration than words that were presented as anagrams to be 
solved. Unlike stem completion, cued recall involves both 
generation processes and recognition processes; therefore, 
shallow processing would result in performance deficits 
because of effects upon recognition processes. 
Further, in one study, Jacoby and Hollingshead (1990, 
Exp. 1) included a generate/recognize condition that was 
contrasted with the cued recall and stem completion 
conditions described above. In the generate/recognize 
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condition, subjects were asked to provide recognition memory 
judgments for words they produced as stem completions, 
immediately after completion of each stem. The results 
indicated that requiring a recognition judgment did not 
affect generation processes as the probabilities of 
providing target words did not differ across the stem 
completion and generate/recognize conditions, a finding that 
further supports the notion of separable effects of 
generation and recognition. 
Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of the study was twofold. First, a 
comparison was made between explicit (cued recall) and 
implicit (fragment completion) memory for affectively 
valenced materials in depression. Second, a measure of 
recognition performance was included to attempt to sort out 
the relative contributions of generation and recognition 
processes across tasks. 
The results obtained earlier by Denny and Hunt using an 
explicit measure, free recall, replicated those previously 
reported in the literature. That is, depressives evidenced 
a recall bias favoring negatively toned material while 
nondepressed subjects evidenced a recall bias favoring 
positively toned material. Conversely, when asked to 
complete word fragments with the first words that came to 
mind, ostensibly an implicit memory task, the differential 
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effect of word valence disappeared. Depressed and 
nondepressed subjects exhibited equivalent levels of priming 
for positive and negative words. As previously discussed, 
however, these results are not without interpretive 
difficulties because both level of cue support and 
instructions were varied across memory task conditions. 
Thus, in the present study, cue support was held constant 
across memory task conditions while instructions were 
varied. 
In this study, depressed and nondepressed subjects were 
asked first to provide self-reference judgments about a 
series of positively and negatively valenced words. Then 
the memory tests were given. In the explicit memory 
condition (cued recall), subjects were given a list of word 
fragments and asked to use these fragments as cues to help 
them remember the list of words presented in the study task. 
In the implicit memory condition (fragment completion), 
subjects were asked to complete the fragments with the 
"first word that comes to mind." After completion of the 
latter memory task, subjects were asked to identify the 
fragments completed as words seen in the rating task, a 
recognition task. 
Consistent with previous research, in the explicit 
memory condition, it was expected that depressives would 
show enhanced recall of negatively toned words relative to 
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positively toned words. Conversely, nondepressed subjects 
were expected to show enhanced recall of positively toned 
words relative to negatively toned words. 
These predictions regarding an explicit memory bias were 
derived from findings from previous research and are 
consistent with predictions derived from Beck's (1967) model 
of depression. Similarly, the predicted pattern of results 
may be interpreted in terms of the model of depression put 
forth by Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews (1988). In 
the latter model, the processing bias favoring negative 
material in depression is posited to occur after the 
preattentive stages of processing and influences 
elaboration. Consequently, Beck's model and Williams et 
al.'s model yield compatible predictions regarding explicit 
memory performance. 
As previously discussed, potential differences between 
these two theoretical positions emerged in terms of 
predictions regarding implicit memory performance. Although 
the results from Denny and Hunt are problematic in some 
ways, nonetheless, they do suggest that the "filtering" 
version of Beck's theory is untenable. In addition, 
predictions derived from Williams et al.'s model are quite 
clear-cut. Because these authors posit that preattentive 
filtering does not occur, a negative bias will not occur. 
In the current experiment, it was predicted that depressed 
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and nondepressed subjects would exhibit equivalent levels of 
priming for positive and negative words, in other words, no 
implicit memory bias. This prediction is consistent with 
Williams et al.'s theory and the "facilitation" version of 
Beck's theory. 
The recognition measure approximated the 
generate/recognize condition described by Jacoby and 
Hollingshead. The recognition data were expected to reveal 
the following pattern of results. When judging "new" words, 
depressed and nondepressed subjects were not expected to 
differ as a function of word valence. When judging "old" 
words, depressed subjects were expected to recognize more 
negative than positive words, whereas nondepressed subjects 
were expected to recognize more positive than negative 
words. This pattern mirrors the pattern expected in cued 
recall. However, the recognition task was thought to 
provide a more stringent test of the hypothesis that the 
explicit bias is due to controlled recognition processes 
rather than generation processes. Because differences in 
generation were not expected as a function of group and word 
valence on the fragment completion task, an observed 
performance dissociation between fragment completion and 
recognition would argue strongly for the contribution of 
controlled recognition processes to the effects of affective 





A comparison between patterns of explicit and implicit 
memory performance as a function of diagnostic group 
(depressed versus nondepressed) and word valence (positive 
versus negative) was of primary interest in the study. 
However, implicit and explicit performance levels cannot be 
compared directly in one experiment because of the lack of a 
common ground on which to scale the dependent variables. 
Therefore, the study actually consisted of two experiments 
and involved two independent groups of subjects. One 
experiment measured explicit memory performance as reflected 
by cued recall. The other experiment measured implicit 
memory performance as reflected by fragment completion, and 
also included a measure of recognition memory. For the sake 
of simplicity, however, in most subsections of the Method 
section, this procedural division is not emphasized. 
Subjects 
Twenty depressed and twenty-four nondepressed women 
served as subjects in the studyl. Within each group, 
subjects were assigned randomly to the two experiments. 
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Potential subjects for the depressed group were paid $15 
and were recruited from several sources which are described 
below. The following criteria were used to select subjects 
for the depressed group. First, these subjects received 
diagnoses of either Major Depression or Dysthymia^. Second, 
they did not qualify for diagnoses of Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder, Panic Disorder, Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia, 
Agoraphobia, Social Phobia, or Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder. These diagnostic decisions were based on 
administration of the Mood and Anxiety Modules of the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R-Patient Version 
(SCID-P; Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1988; see 
Appendix A for a sample of this measure)3. Third, these 
subjects scored 12 or above on the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961; see 
Appendix B for a sample of this measure). Finally, these 
subjects had not received electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) 
during the past three months. 
Subjects for the nondepressed control group were 
recruited from the introductory psychology pool at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNC-G) and 
received experimental credit for their participation. For 
this group, the following criteria were used. First, these 
subjects did not qualify for diagnoses of Major Depression, 
Dysthymia, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorder, 
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Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia, Agoraphobia, Social Phobia, 
or Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder2 based on administration of 
the SCID-P (Spitzer et al., 1988). Second, they reported 
having no previous inpatient psychiatric hospitalizations, 
and no outpatient psychiatric treatment within the past six 
months. Finally, these subjects scored 9 or below on the 
BDI (Beck et al., 1961). 
Because Williams et al. propose that depression and 
anxiety exert effects on different components in the 
information processing sequence, care was taken to insure 
that the experimental results were not confounded by 
anxiety. Although the depressed subjects scored 
significantly higher than nondepressed subjects (see 
Appendix D; Table 2) on the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (Welsh, 1956; see Appendix C), 
depressed subjects were not included in the study if they 
qualified for an anxiety disorder diagnosis, as was 
previously mentioned. However, average correlations of .61 
between measures of depression and measures of anxiety have 
been reported in the literature (Dobson, 1985). Although 
the selection procedures used in this experiment served to 
truncate the overall range of anxiety scores, as well as to 
truncate the within group ranges of depression scores, 
nonetheless, correlations between depression and anxiety may 
be of interest to some readers. In this study, when 
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depressed subjects from both groups were combined, a 
correlation of .34 between BDI scores and MMPI Anxiety 
Scores was observed, whereas when nondepressed subjects from 
groups were combined, a correlation of .12 was observed. 
Neither of these correlations differed significantly from 
zero (observed p values .14 and .56, respectively; Table 1, 
Appendix D.) 
In this study, the experimenter was not blind to 
recruitment sources; thus, to avoid suggestions of 
"experimenter biasing" effects, actual assessments were not 
carried out until the conclusion of the experimental 
sessions. In addition, although administration and scoring 
of the SCID-P is very straightforward, prior to subject 
inclusion/exclusion, an independent judge who was blind to 
the experimental hypotheses rated 7 0% of the written SCID-P 
protocols. Inter-rater reliability was found to be 100%. 
Based on the criteria described above, it was necessary 
to discard 26 subjects who did not meet the criteria for 
membership in either group. Most commonly, subjects were 
discarded because they scored above 12 on the BDI and yet 
did not qualify for diagnoses of either Major Depression or 
Dysthymia (n=12). Further, seven of the discarded subjects 
qualified for concomitant mood and anxiety disorder 
diagnoses. 
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As previously mentioned, several methods were used to 
recruit depressed subjects. The final sample of 20 subjects 
contained eight who responded to an advertisement in the 
local paper (see Appendix E), four who were referred through 
the Psychology Clinic at UNC-G, seven who were referred 
through other on-going studies in the UNC-G Psychology 
Department, and one who responded to a notice (Appendix E) 
posted at the Counseling Center at UNC-G. 
The two groups were matched on age and level of 
education because these variables may be associated with 
differences in memory functioning. The means and statistical 
comparisons of these variables are displayed in Appendix D, 
Table 2. In addition, all subjects were female, native 
English speakers. Although gender differences have 
occasionally been reported in the memory literature, the 
vast majority of studies examining explicit memory for 
affective information in depression have utilized female 
subjects only (Blaney, 1986). In view of the primary goal 
of this study, it appeared prudent to employ a population 
similar to that utilized in prior research. 
Materials 
Forty-eight words were selected from those used in 
previous research measuring depressives1 memory for 
affectively toned materials (Badawi, 1985; Denny & Hunt, 
1992; Kuiper, Derry, & MacDonald, 1982) . The negative words 
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used were not merely negative in tone, but were also 
depression-related. The complete word list appears in 
Appendix F. 
Two lists of 24 words were constructed for use in the 
study task. These lists appear in Appendix G. Each list 
contained 12 positively and 12 negatively valenced words. 
Word length and word frequency were equated as a function of 
valence both within lists and across lists. Assignment of 
the two word lists was counterbalanced across conditions. 
Word fragments. A word fragment with a unique solution 
was created for each of the 48 words. These fragments 
appear in Appendix H. Efforts were made to insure that the 
fragments were of comparable difficulty. For example, the 
initial letter was provided for an equal number of positive 
and negative fragments. Further, the ratios of omitted 
letters to total letters were equivalent for the positive 
and negative fragments. Finally, these constraints were 
balanced for the fragments corresponding to the words on 
each study list. 
Study booklets. For use in the study task, booklets 
were prepared. For each study list, the words were typed in 
lowercase letters, six words to a page. A 6-point Likert 
scale appeared below each word, anchored at the lower end 
with "does not describe me at all," and at the upper end 
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with "describes me very well." A sample page appears in 
Appendix I. 
For each list, two presentation orders were derived 
randomly with the restriction that no more than three words 
of the same affective valence appeared in a row. Due to the 
size of the sample, assignment of presentation orders was 
incompletely counterbalanced across conditions. 
Test booklets. For use in the memory tests, booklets 
were prepared. Each fragment was typed on a 1 1/2 x 8 inch 
sheet of paper. For each subject, the fragments were 
arranged in a randomly derived order with the restriction 
that no more than three fragments representing the same word 
valence or study list condition appeared in a row. 
Procedure 
Subjects were tested individually and were told that the 
experiment consisted of a number of paper and pencil tasks 
involving words. They were asked to sign a consent form 
which appears in Appendix J. First, all subjects engaged in 
the study phase. Subjects were given word list booklets and 
were told that the experimenter was interested in judgments 
people make about words. They were asked to circle numbers 
on the scales below the words to indicate how applicable the 
words were to themselves. Subjects were not informed that 
memory for these words would be tested. 
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Subjects in the cued recall condition were given 
booklets containing the word fragments and were asked to use 
the fragments as cues to help them remember the words from 
the study task. For each of these subjects, half of the 
fragments corresponded to the words seen in the study phase. 
The remaining fragments represented new items, that is, 
items from the non-studied list. Subjects were told that 
some of the fragments corresponded to words that did not 
appear on the studied list. They were told to report a 
solution only if they were actually able to recall the word 
from the study list. Subjects were allowed 20 seconds per 
item for cued recall. 
Subjects in the fragment completion condition were also 
given booklets containing the word fragments. They were 
told that the experimenter was collecting data regarding the 
words that people generate to word fragments. They were 
asked to write the "first word that comes to mind" for each 
fragment. For each of these subjects, half of the fragments 
corresponded to words seen in the study phase ("old" items) 
while the remaining fragments represented items from the 
non-studied list ("new" items). Subjects were allowed 20 
seconds per item for fragment completion. Following the 
fragment completion task, subjects were asked to circle the 
completed fragments that they remembered seeing in the study 
task. 
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After completion of the memory tests, a short distractor 
task was given. Subjects read the opening paragraph of F. 
Scott Fitzgerald's short story, "The Rough Crossing" (1929, 
uncollected; 1951; see Appendix K) and were asked to guess 
which body of water the traveler was preparing to cross. 
This task was included to insure that later assessments 
would be free of any potential effects induced by the 
experimental tasks. 
Following the distractor task, subjects completed the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al.; 1961) and the 
Anxiety Scale from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (Welsh, 1956). The experimenter then administered 
the Mood and Anxiety Modules of the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-III- R- Patient Version (SCID-P; Spitzer 
et al., 1988). Debriefing followed. The complete debriefing 




Means tables, analysis of variance (ANOVA) tables, and 
t-test statistics for all tests performed appear in Appendix 
D. Thus, unless nonsignificant results are particularly 
germane to the experimental hypotheses, they are not 
reported below. A .05 significance level was used in all 
cases. 
Cued Recall 
Mean cued recall scores are presented in Table 3. 
Recall data were subjected to a 2 X 2 analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with group as a between-subjects variable and word 
valence as a within-subjects variable. No main effects were 
revealed; more importantly, however, a significant Group X 
Word Valence interaction was detected, F(1,20)=5.00, p<.04 
(Table 4). Because predictions were made a priori, matched 
one-tailed t-tests were performed. These tests revealed 
that, as expected, depressed subjects recalled more negative 
(mean=.62) than positive (mean=.55) words, t(9)=-2.36, 
SEd=.09, p<.02, whereas nondepressed subjects recalled more 
positive (mean=.65) than negative (mean=.56) words, 
t(11)=2.58, SEd=.13, p<.01. 
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A preliminary analysis indicated that the depressed and 
nondepressed groups differed on level of anxiety, t(20)= 
3.04, SEm=3.02, pc.01 (Table 2), although it must be noted 
that the clinical significance of the above difference in 
anxiety scores is highly questionable. When the depressed 
group's raw MMPI Anxiety scores are converted to T-scores 
(Dahlstrom, Welsh, & Dahlstrom, 1972), a mean of only 59 
results. This score is far below that which is typically 
considered indicative of clinically significant anxiety 
(Graham, 1987). Nonetheless, one might ask if the above 
significant cued recall results could be explained by the 
observed between-group difference in anxiety. Because the 
correlations (reported in the Method section; see also Table 
1) between depression and anxiety did not attain 
significance in either group, one may safely dismiss this 
possibility. 
Word Fragment Completion 
Word fragment completion data are presented in Table 5. 
A preliminary analysis revealed no differences in 
performance on new words; that is, no differences in 
baseline performance (Table 6). As is standard practice, 
priming scores were then computed by subtracting the 
percentage of new fragments completed from the percentage of 
old fragments completed. These scores were then subjected 
to a 2 X 2 ANOVA with group as a between-subjects factor and 
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word valence as a within-subjects factor. The results 
revealed no main effects, and more importantly, as 
predicted, no Group X Word Valence interaction, F(l,20)=.08, 
p<.7 8 (Table 7). This lack of interaction indicates that 
priming of positive and negative material was equivalent 
across groups. 
Recognition 
Recognition data are presented in Table 8. Because 
subjects made recognition judgments only for items they 
completed in the fragment completion condition, recognition 
scores were conditionalized on ,the number of fragments 
completed in each category. Conditionalized recognition 
data were subjected to 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA with group as a 
between-subjects variable and word valence and judgment type 
as within-subjects variables (Table 9). Not surprisingly, a 
highly significant main effect for judgment type was 
detected, F(l,20)=29.53, pC.OOOl, indicating that all 
subjects were more likely to recognize old words (i.e., 
"hit") than new words (i.e., "false alarm"). Somewhat 
surprisingly, a main effect for group was also detected, 
F(1,20)=8.62, p<.008, indicating that depressed subjects 
were less likely than nondepressed subjects to indicate 
recognition of all items. This effect was qualified, 
however, by an unexpected Group X Word Valence interaction 
which approached significance, F(1,20)=3.08, p<.09. 
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Although further statistical comparisons were inappropriate, 
informal inspection of the observed pattern of means 
suggests that the weight of this marginal interaction was 
due to unexpected group differences on new words, rather 




Depressed and nondepressed subjects' memory for 
affectively valenced material was assessed with both cued 
recall, an explicit test, and word fragment completion, an 
implicit test. As predicted, under cued recall 
instructions, depressed subjects recalled more negatively 
than positively toned words, whereas nondepressed subjects 
recalled more positively than negatively toned words. These 
results replicate previous findings utilizing free recall 
instructions (Denny & Hunt, 1992) and, more importantly, 
indicate that depressives1 robust tendency to recall 
negative information under explicit memory instructions is 
not ameliorated by the presence of positive word fragment 
cues. In addition, these results are consistent with 
findings which were reported after this work was begun 
(Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, & Fuller, 1992). Although 
there are a number of methodological differences between the 
current study and that which was reported by Watkins et al., 
the converging results suggest that depressives' negatively 
biased explicit memory performance is a function of 
strategic, controlled processes, rather than automatic 
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processes. This conclusion is consistent with the model put 
forth by Williams and his colleagues. 
Results obtained in the fragment completion condition 
provide complementary support for this conclusion because, 
as predicted, depressed and nondepressed subjects exhibited 
equivalent levels of priming of positive and negative words. 
Recall that performance on implicit tasks is not thought to 
be affected by elaborative encoding tasks, nor is it a 
function of consciously controlled processes at retrieval. 
Consequently, these results argue that, despite differential 
degrees of elaboration, recently acquired positive and 
negative information remains equally likely to automatically 
"come to mind" for depressed and nondepressed individuals. 
Although these priming effects were of principal 
experimental interest, the observed lack of baseline 
differences also suggests that, a priori, the availability 
of positively and negatively valenced material did not 
differ across groups. 
A final auxiliary point concerning the fragment 
completion results may be made. In his accompanying 
commentary, Roediger (Roediger & McDermott, 1992) pointed 
out that implicit memory results from both Denny and Hunt 
(1992) and Watkins et al. (1992) evidenced hints of small, 
albeit nonsignificant, effects which paralleled these 
authors' explicit findings. These mood-congruent implicit 
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effects ranged in size from 2 percent to 6 percent across 
experiments and led Roediger to hypothesize tentatively that 
the small sample sizes in these experiments may have 
obscured a true interaction between group and word valence. 
Although it is admittedly quite risky to assign critical 
empirical weight to nonsignificant findings, it is worth 
noting that in the current experiment both depressed and 
nondepressed subjects exhibited a slight memorial advantage 
for positive words (2 percent and 5 percent, respectively). 
Therefore, at the very best, these results provide equivocal 
support for Roediger's conjecture. 
To summarize thus far, the results from the explicit 
test (cued recall) and the implicit test (fragment 
completion) converge nicely. More specifically, the 
observed test dissociation supports the notion that 
depressives' selective memory deficits are a function of 
controlled, strategic processes rather than automatic 
processes. 
Interpretation of results obtained in the recognition 
memory condition is more problematic, however. If, indeed, 
as Jacoby and Hollingshead (1990) have suggested, retrieval 
from memory involves separable, but temporally dependent, 
automatic (generation) and strategic (recognition) phases, 
then logically one would have expected depressed subjects to 
evidence negatively biased memory when asked to make 
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recognition judgments regarding "old" items that were 
previously generated. Yet an examination of the recognition 
scores in Table 12 reveals no hint of within-group 
differences in correct recognition as a function of valence. 
As such, these findings neither provide support for the 
above specific hypothesis nor for the generate/recognize 
model in general. 
Prior to discussing these results in detail, it is 
interesting to note that Jacoby (Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 
1993) has discarded the generate/recognize model in favor of 
an independence model of retrieval. Recall that when 
proposing a dependence model, Jacoby and Hollingshead (1990) 
successfully used the additive product of stem completion 
and recognition memory performance to predict cued recall 
performance. In his more recent work, however, Jacoby 
(Jacoby et al., 1993) suggests that certain assumptions that 
Jacoby and Hollingshead made about the nature of their tasks 
may have been unfounded and may have led to spurious 
findings. More specifically, he reminds us that stem 
completion was assumed to represent a process-pure measure 
of generation, whereas recognition was assumed to represent 
a process-pure measure of strategic recollection. In 
reality, stem completion performance could have been 
contaminated by the involvement of explicit recollection 
processes. If this hypothesized contamination did in fact 
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occur, then Jacoby and Hollingshead were essentially using a 
disguised measure of cued recall in order to predict cued 
recall. As a solution to these difficulties, Jacoby 
(Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby et al., 1993) has proposed the 
adoption of a process-dissociation procedure, and thus far, 
has utilized data gathered under this type of procedure to 
argue for an independence model of retrieval. 
A complete discussion of Jacoby1s process-dissociation 
experimental paradigm and his resultant model is beyond the 
scope of this manuscript; however, several points may be 
made concerning the relevance of his above argument to the 
current findings. First, like Jacoby and Hollingshead, in 
this experiment, word fragment completion was assumed to 
represent a relatively pure measure of generation processes. 
Second, the possibility of contamination of this measure by 
explicit strategic retrieval processes cannot be ruled out 
unequivocally. Nevertheless, if contamination did occur, 
one would not have anticipated the pattern of fragment 
completion data obtained; instead, one would have expected 
depressed subjects to produce more negative word completions 
and nondepressed subjects to produce more positive word 
completions. Inherent in this argument, of course, is the 
assumption that the differences observed in cued recall 
should properly be attributed to differences in conscious, 
strategic recollection processes. 
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Although Jacoby's specific criticisms of Jacoby and 
Hollingshead's work do not appear applicable here, his ideas 
do suggest a plausible account for the current pattern of 
recognition data. It may be the case that these data were 
contaminated by automatic influences of memory. If one 
seriously entertains this hypothesis, then the observed 
pattern of data is certainly not surprising. 
Before accepting such a conclusion, one must necessarily 
ask why such contamination might have occurred. One 
explanation concerns particular aspects of the experimental 
procedure. Although Jacoby and Hollingshead reported that 
requiring a recognition judgment after each stem completion 
did not affect generation processes, the present overall 
empirical question required a more stringent defense against 
potential contamination by controlled processes. To this 
end, subjects in the implicit condition first attempted to 
complete the 4 8 word fragments under "first word that comes 
to mind" instructions. Following completion of this task, 
these subjects were asked to make recognition judgments. 
Accordingly, for these subjects, a delay period of up to 17 
minutes occurred between generation (fragment completion) 
and recollection (recognition). In addition, and perhaps 
more importantly, the retention interval between study list 
exposure and the explicit memory test differed across the 
recall and recognition conditions. One might be tempted to 
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argue that this delay period is not of great magnitude, and 
admittedly, it is not. Studies have shown, however, that on 
both word fragment completion (Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 
1982) and word identification tests (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981), 
priming effects tend to persist over time, whereas 
recognition memory declines. Furthermore, a second point 
concerning this temporal confound may be made. Given that 
the delay period did not simply represent a delay, but 
rather a period in which fragment completion subjects 
engaged in mental activity, a general form of retroactive 
inhibition could have played a role in these subjects' later 
performance. Indeed, one study has shown that both 
proactive and retroactive interference impair explicit 
recall and recognition, but do not affect priming (Graf & 
Schacter, 1987). 
The above points suggest that, due to the delay period, 
recollection may have been more degraded in the recognition 
condition than in the cued recall condition. Furthermore, 
it has been shown that automatic effects of memory would be 
relatively impervious to the aforementioned delay period. 
If, in actuality, recognition subjects experienced 
considerable difficulty remembering the items on the study 
list, nevertheless they could have performed quite credibly 
by basing their judgments on a sense of familiarity or 
fluency; in other words, recognition performance may more 
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accurately reflect primary reliance on automatic, 
unconscious influences of memory, rather than on strategic, 
consciously controlled processes. 
Thus far, this discussion has focused exclusively on the 
correct recognition results. Based on these results alone, 
the preceding argument has been shown to be somewhat 
persuasive. However, one must also consider the errors 
subjects made, namely, the false alarm data. Examination of 
the means in Table 12 reveals that both depressed and 
nondepressed subjects exhibited relatively high rates of 
false alarms. In other words, all subjects tended to 
"recognize" words that were not rated during the study task. 
Does the argument presented provide a suitable explanation 
for this finding? The answer is a resounding yes. Not only 
can the argument satisfactorily explain high false alarm 
rates, but one would necessarily have predicted these data. 
In this experiment, "new" words were not distractors in the 
typical sense, rather, they represented new, successfully 
completed items on the fragment completion test. Therefore, 
subjects had been exposed to these items, and this prior 
exposure would been been sufficient to produce a feeling of 
familiarity when these items were later encountered on the 
recognition task. If, as hypothesized, subjects were 
relying on familiarity when making recognition judgments, 
relatively high rates of false alarms would result. 
39 
Further, recall that a highly significant main effect for 
hits versus false alarms was observed. One might be tempted 
to suggest that this main effect disarms the above argument. 
Upon closer examination, however, this counterargument is 
untenable. First, it has not been suggested that subjects 
had absolutely no ability to recollect the study list. 
Instead, it has been proposed that due to the experimental 
procedure, recollection was degraded. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, subjects had been exposed to the old words 
twice — once during the study phase and once during 
fragment completion; exposure to the new words was limited 
to one occasion — the fragment completion test. Increased 
repetition would have increased the availability and 
familiarity of the old items relative to the new items, and 
would have resulted in superior "recognition" of old items. 
Although overall rates of false alarms can be explained 
satisfactorily within the preceding framework, this 
experiment also revealed a marginal interaction involving 
group and word valence, as well as a main effect for group. 
As previously discussed, the weight of these effects was due 
to a group difference on positive false alarms. It is clear 
that the argument put forth thus far cannot easily explain 
these results. To aid in the interpretation of these 
results, it is necessary to turn to extant empirical 
findings regarding recognition memory in depression. 
40 
In contrast to the consistent findings which have been 
reported concerning depressives' recall, a review of the 
literature, unfortunately, reveals controversial findings 
regarding depressives' recognition memory (Calev & Erwin, 
1985; Cole & Zarit, 1984; Davis & Unruh, 1980; Dunbar & 
Lishman, 1984; Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Martin & Clark, 1986; 
Miller & Lewis, 1977; Silberman, Weingartner, Laraia, 
Byrnes, & Post, 1983; Watts, Morris, & MacLeod, 1987; 
Zuroff, Colussy, & Wielgus, 1983). Several studies have 
revealed a significant effect of depression on correct 
recognition (Dunbar & Lishman; 1984; Miller & Lewis, 1977; 
Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Silberman, Weingartner, Laraia, 
Byrnes, & Post, 1983, Watts, Morris, & MacLeod, 1987) while 
others have not (Cole & Zarit, 1984; Davis & Unruh, 1980; 
Zuroff, Colussy, & Wielgus, 1983). For purposes of the 
present discussion, studies that have examined depressives' 
hit rates, as well as false alarm rates may be relevant. In 
addition, only studies utilizing affectively valenced 
material are reviewed. 
Silberman and his colleagues (1983) reported that 
depression reduced hit rates, but found no effect of 
depression on false alarm rates. Conversely, Zuroff and his 
colleagues (Zuroff et al., 1983) reported that hit rates 
were unaffected by depression, whereas negative false alarm 
rates were increased. Finally, Dunbar and Lishman (1984) 
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found that depression decreased both hit and false alarm 
rates. Despite the preceding inconsistent findings, some 
agreement was reached in the above studies which employed 
signal detection analysis (Dunbar and Lishman, 1984; Zuroff 
et al., 1983). In both of these studies, depression was 
found to affect beta (a measure of response bias), but not 
d' (a measure of recognition sensitivity). These results 
suggest that depressives1 memory deficits may be a function 
of response bias. 
In the present experiment, subjects made recognition 
judgments only for items that were successfully completed 
during the word fragment completion test. Therefore, the 
proportion of old versus new items was not equivalent across 
subjects. As a result, a signal detection analysis cannot 
be carried out on the present data. Nonetheless, one must 
consider the possibility that the current experimental 
results may be attributable to response bias. Certainly the 
cued recall data could be interpreted within this framework, 
as depressed subjects may have simply been more willing to 
report negative self-descriptive information than positive 
self-descriptive information. However, if a response bias 
were operative, the recognition data are somewhat puzzling. 
In order to argue for the existence of a response bias, one 
should be able to demonstrate differential performance, in 
other words, bias. In the current experiment, a negative 
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bias was evident for depressed subjects when judging "new" 
words, but not when judging "old" words. 
Recall that Zuroff and his colleagues reported that hit 
rates were unaffected by depression, whereas negative false 
alarm rates were increased, results which appear similar to 
the current findings. Thus, a closer examination of their 
findings may prove informative. First, as Martin and Clark 
(1986) have pointed out, in all of the Zuroff et al. 
analyses, positive and negative material was examined 
separately. Second, in their signal detection analyses, it 
appears that positive material was omitted from statistical 
testing. In addition, the means reported by Zuroff et al. 
reveal that depressed subjects produced more positive item 
false alarms than did nondepressed subjects, and had lower 
beta values than nondepressed subjects for both positive and 
negative items. Taken together, these results suggest that 
Zuroff et al.'s claim that depressives' preferential memory 
for negative information results from a response bias is 
unwarranted. Rather, it may be the case that when faced 
with a recognition task, depressives adopt a more 
conservative response criterion, regardless of the affective 
valence of the material involved. 
The results of the current experiment may be consistent 
with the above hypothesis. It is certainly the case that, 
overall, depressives were significantly less likely to 
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indicate that they recognized items than were 
nondepressives. These results are consistent with the notion 
that regardless of information valence, depressives may 
adopt a more conservative response criterion. However, it 
is also the case that the current results suggest that 
depressives' performance may differ as a function of valence 
when judgments involve new items. In other words, within the 
depressed group, new positive material appeared less likely 
to elicit incorrect recognition (i.e., false alarm) 
judgments than did new negative material. Because the 
observed interaction between group and word valence did not 
attain statistical significance, this must remain an open 
question and suggests directions for future research. 
Although the recognition condition presented a puzzle 
yet to be solved, the cued recall results were rather clear-
cut. In this experiment it was shown that depressives' 
robust tendency to recall negative information under 
explicit memory instructions is not ameliorated by the 
presence of positive word fragment cues. Further, these 
results suggest that depressives' negatively biased explicit 
memory performance is a function of strategic, controlled 
processes, rather than automatic processes. 
Results obtained in the fragment completion condition 
provided further support for this conclusion because, as 
predicted, depressed and nondepressed subjects exhibited 
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equivalent levels of priming of positive and negative words. 
Consequently, these results argue that, despite differential 
degrees of elaboration, recently acquired positive and 
negative information remains equally likely to automatically 
"come to mind" for depressed and nondepressed individuals. 
Clinical Implications 
From the standpoint of the development of clinical 
theory, as well as the development of effective intervention 
strategies, an understanding of cognitive processes 
associated with depression may hold important implications. 
In particular, the present results suggest that the self-
reports of clinically depressed clients are likely to be 
negatively biased. If one were attempting to assess, for 
example, rates of pleasant events, assessment data gathered 
from clients would likely be inaccurate. This suggests the 
need to involve family members or friends in assessment 
processes. Further, the results of cued recall indicate 
that positive information was not recalled by depressives 
despite the presence of positive cues. Thus, providing 
homework cues may not be as effective as many therapists 
assume. Finally, the results of fragment completion 
indicate that despite an explicit memory bias, positive 
material is processed by depressed individuals. Although it 
remains a goal of future research to determine the precise 
behavioral implications this holds, one could speculate that 
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less directive therapy techniques might be of use when 
treating depression. For example, although cognitive 
therapy, a relatively directive approach, has been shown to 
be an effective treatment, it might be possible to increase 
compliance by utilizing less directive assignments early in 
the treatment process. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
The results of the present study revealed that 
depressives' robust tendency to recall negative information 
under explicit memory instructions is not ameliorated by the 
presence of positive word fragment cues. Further, these 
results suggest that depressives1 negatively biased explicit 
memory performance is a function of strategic, controlled 
processes, rather than automatic processes. 
Further support for this conclusion was garnered 
because, as predicted, depressed and nondepressed subjects 
exhibited equivalent levels of priming of positive and 
negative words in the fragment completion condition. 
Consequently, these results argue that, despite differential 
degrees of elaboration, recently acquired positive and 
negative information remains equally likely to automatically 
"come to mind" for depressed and nondepressed individuals. 
The results obtained in the recognition condition were 
much less clear-cut and suggest the need for further 
research. Although the present data do not support the 
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generate-recognize model of retrieval, these data can be 
explained by several competing hypotheses. On the one hand, 
it may be the case that when faced with a recognition task, 
depressives adopt a more stringent response criterion, 
regardless of information valence. On the other hand, the 
observed, marginal interaction between group and word 
valence suggests that valence may, in fact, affect 
performance on a recognition memory task. Finally, it may 
be the case that, due to aspects of the experimental 
procedure, all subjects relied more heavily on automatic 
rather than on strategic processes when making recognition 
judgments. 
In future research, several approaches could be used to 
discriminate between the above alternatives. First, as 
previously discussed, the design of the present experiment 
precluded the use of signal detection analysis. Although 
conflicting results have been reported in the literature 
when this analysis has been employed, in general, these 
studies have not also included a measure of recall. Thus, 
it is not possible to determine if the conflicting results 
inform us of true variance in depressives' recognition 
memory, or rather simply represent variance in subject 
groups, procedures, and/or materials. Because the tendency 
of depressives towards negatively biased recall appears to 
be an extremely robust finding, one might use this as a 
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conceptual "standard", or "baseline" when evaluating 
depressives' performance on other tasks. 
A second approach that could be adopted involves the use 
of Jacoby's process-dissociation procedure (e.g., Jacoby, 
1991; Jacoby et al., 1993). As previously discussed, his 
basic notion is that tasks are not process-pure, and, 
therefore, comparing tasks is not informative if one is 
actually interested in underlying processes. In his 
procedure, a comparison is made between an "inclusion" 
condition in which automatic and strategic processes produce 
the same effect, and an "exclusion" condition in which 
automatic and strategic processes exert opposing effects. 
Through the use of simple algebra and observed 
probabilities, it is possible to obtain estimates of the 
contributions of automatic and strategic processes. One 
could hypothesize that the recognition task used in the 
present experiment more accurately represented an 
"inclusion" condition, and that the absence of an 
"exclusion" condition necessarily limits interpretation of 
the data. Further, given the muddled state of the 
literature concerned with depressives1 recognition memory, 
adoption of Jacoby's approach could prove fruitful. 
Finally, the present study is limited in the conclusions 
that can be drawn regarding the relationship between 
depression and anxiety. Although depressives' memory 
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performance was of primary interest in this study, a full 
test of Williams et al.'s model would involve inclusion of 
clinically anxious, as well as clinically depressed 
subjects. Moreover, inclusion of dual diagnosis subjects 
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NOTES 
1 To determine the sample size necessary to detect the 
hypothesized interaction between group and word valence in 
the cued recall condition, an expected effect size was 
estimated based on free recall data from Denny and Hunt 
(1992). A subsequent power analysis indicated that 5 
subjects per group was adequate to detect this interaction. 
Differences were possible between free recall and cued 
recall in terms of magnitude of effect, however. Therefore, 
this estimate was revised upward resulting in the use of 10 
depressed and 12 nondepressed subjects in the cued recall 
condition. 
At the time this research was begun, very few studies of 
implicit memory in clinical populations had appeared in the 
literature. Although the results from Denny and Hunt 
indicated that priming of positive and negative information 
was equivalent across depressed and nondepressed subjects, 
it was conceivable that this null finding was due entirely 
to lack of sufficient power. Hence, prior to conducting a 
power analysis, it was necessary to posit a meaningful 
effect size for an interaction between group and word 
valence in the word fragment completion. Because effect 
sizes are typically large when utilizing free recall, a 
medium effect size was deemed meaningful in word fragment 
completion. The estimate of variance utilized was based on 
56 
data from Denny and Hunt. Because the variance was slightly 
less in word fragment completion than in free recall, a 
subsequent power analysis indicated that 8 per group was 
adequate to detect an interaction. Again, to be 
conservative, this estimate was revised upward. Thus, 10 
depressed and 12 nondepressed subjects were utlilized in the 
word fragment completion condition. 
2 Because only one subject in the entire sample 
qualified for a diagnosis of dysthymia, the results of this 
experiment apply mainly to Major Depressive Disorder. 
3 Although intended to be compatible with DSM-III-R, the 
SCID-P does not evaluate symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder. Therefore, subjects in this experiment were not 
assessed for the presence of this disorder. Additionally, a 
priori, it was determined that potential subjects would not 
be excluded based on a diagnosis of Simple Phobia as it was 
believed that this disorder was irrelevant in terms of the 
experimental hypotheses. 
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Appendix D 
Analysis Summary Tables 
Table 1 
Correlation Analysis: BDI and MMPI Anxiety Scores 
Variable Group N Mean r 
BDI Nondepressed 24 3.9 (2.4) 
Anxiety Nondepressed 24 9.2 (6.2) 
. 1 2  
BDI Depressed 20 19.6 (6.0) 
Anxiety Depresesed 20 18.6 (8.2) 
.34 
(Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations) 
65 
Table 2 
Means and Two-Tailed t-Test Significance Levels for 
Demographic and Mood Variables as a Function of Group and 
Test Condition 
Group 




MMPI Anxiety Score 19.1 
BDI Score* 20.0 
Word Fragment Completion 
Age 29.4 
Education 13.8 
MMPI Anxiety Score 18.1 
BDI Score* 19.1 
(9.2) 23 .1(4. 7) < .  34 
(1.6) 14 .0(1. 5) < .  67 
(7.3) 9 .9(6. 8) < .  01 
(5.5) 4 .8(2. 5) < .  01 
(12.4) 22 .9(3. 9) < .  10 
(2.0) 13 .9(1. 0) < .  86 
(9.4) 8 .4(5. 5) < .  01 
(6.7) 3 .0(0. 5) 
(Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations) 
* Criterion variable, no test performed 
Table 3 
Mean Proportion Recalled as a Function of Group and 
Word Valence 
Group 
Word Valence Depressed Nondepressed 
Positive .55 (.20) .65 (.17) 
Negative .62 (.19) .56 (.11) 
(Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations) 
Table 4 
Analysis of Variance: Proportion Recalled 
Source df Mean Square F value 
Between-subjects 
Group 1 0.00442 0.13 
Error 20 0.03469 
Within-subjects 
Valence 1 0.00064 0.04 
Valence x Group 1 0.07450 5.00 ** 
Error (Valence) 20 0.01489 
** £<.05 
Table 5 
Mean Proportion Fragments Completed as a Function 
of Group, Word Type/ and Word Valence 
Word Type 
Word Valence Old New Priming score 
Depressed group 
Positive .52 (.20) .33 (.17) .19 (.21) 
Negative .51 (.16) .34 (.13) .17 (.11) 
Nondepressed group 
Positive .56 (.17) .32 (.14) .24 (.13) 
Negative .51 (.18) .32 (.18) .19 (.19) 
(Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations) 
Table 6 
Analysis of Variance; Proportion New Fragments Completed 
Source df Mean Square F value 
Between-subj ects 
Group 1 0.00134 0. 03 
Error 20 0.04107 
Within-subjects 
Valence 1 0.00019 0. 02 
. Valence x Group 1 0.00019 0. 02 
Error (Valence) 20 0.00789 
Table 7 







Valence x Group 1 
Error (Valence) 20 
Mean Square F value 
0.00884 






0 . 0 8  
Table 8 
Mean Conditionalized Recognition and False Alarms as a 
Function of Group and Word Valence 
Judgment Type 















(Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations) 
Table 9 
Analysis of variance: Conditionalized Recognition and 
False Alarms 
Source df Mean Square F value 
8.62 *** 
Between-subj ects 
Group 1 0.78465 
Error 20 0.09105 
Within-subjects 
Valence 1 0.04703 
Valence x Group 1 0.07110 
Error (Valence) 20 0.02309 
Judgment 1 2.55860 
Judgment X Group 1 0.187 61 
Error (Judgment) 20 0.86658 
Valence X Judgment 1 0.08749 
Valence X Judgment X Group 1 0.07935 
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Feeling Sad or Blue? 
Paid participants are needed for an on-going study at the 
Psychology Dept. at UNCG. The questionnaire-type study is 
concerned with the effects of mood on tasks involving words. 
If you have been feeling sad or blue recently, are female, 
and are at least 18, you may qualify. If you qualify, you 
will be paid $15 for one hour and a half session. Of course, 
all material will be kept confidential. 
Please call 334-5662 and leave your name and phone number 
for Libby Denny. 
Appendix F 
Words used in the study, with their frequencies of 
occurrence per 1,000,000 words^ 
Positive Frequency Negative Freque 
Content Content 
achieving 14 anguish 8 
advancement 11 bitterness 18 
affection 22 criticized 8 
amiable 2 defeated 10 
beauty 68 depressed 10 
capable 66 despair 20 
cheerful 10 destroyed 31 
curious 46 dismal 8 
delighted 15 downcast 2 
energetic 11 empty 64 
exciting 27 failure 93 
friendly 61 forlorn 3 
glorious 16 gloomy 3 
gracious 9 guilty 29 
happiness 22 hopeless 14 
helpful 29 inadequate 32 
(Appendix continues) 
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jovial 1 inferior 7 
kindness 6 jealous 4 
loyal 18 lonely 25 
orderly 19 melancholy 4 
passion 40 oppressed 4 
peaceful 26 troubled 23 
playful 3 unlucky 2 
sociable 1 withdrawn 4 


































Word fragments, with their solutions 
1 o m 
(gloomy) 
i f e o r 
(inferior) 
d i g t d 
(delighted) 
1 n y 
(lonely) 
e a e f 
(peaceful) 
h p 1 s 
(hopeless) 
d n c a 
(downcast) 
j 1 o s 
(jealous) 
n a e u a t e 
(inadequate) 
j _ v 1 
(jovial) 
as i n 
(passion) 
n e g e c 
(energetic) 
m t y 
(empty) 
a u y 
(beauty) 
c e r f 
(cheerful) 
c u i i t 
(curiosity) 
ac ev n 
(achieving) 
ro b d 
(troubled) 
p r s e 
(oppressed) 
c i t n 
(exciting) 
n u i h 
(anguish) 




g r i s 
(glorious) 
u 1 c 
(unlucky) 
e s a r 
(despair) 
g 1 t 
(guilty) 
a p i e s -
(happiness) 
i t d a n 
(withdrawn) 
c p a e 
(capable) 
r e r 1 
(orderly) 
b e ne 
(bitterness) 
r 1 r n 
(forlorn) 
(friendly) 
o c b e 
(sociable) 




c t c e d 
(criticized) 
e 1 u 1 
(helpful) 
i a 1 
(dismal) 
f 1 u e 
(failure) 
d e t o e 
(destroyed) 
f e t o a t 
(affectionate) 
k n n e 
(kindness) 
(Appendix continues) 
d an em n e an 
(advancement) (melancholy) 




Sample of Likert form used in the rating task 
friendly 
Does not Describes me 
describe me very well 
at all 
capable 
Does not Describes me 
describe me very well 
at all 
peaceful 
Does not Describes me 
describe me very well 
at all 
destroyed 
Does not Describes me 
describe me very well 
at all 
unlucky 
Does not Describes me 












I agree to participate in the present study being 
conducted under the supervision of Drs. Reed Hunt and 
Rosemery Nelson-Grey, faculty members of the Psychology 
Department of the University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro. I have been informed, either orally or in 
writing or both, about the procedures to be followed and 
about any discomforts or risks which may be involved. The 
investigator has offered to answer further questions that I 
may have regarding the procedures of this study. I 
understand that I am free to terminate my participation at 
any time without penalty or prejudice. I am aware that 
further information about the conduct and review of human 
research at the University of North Carolina can be obtained 
by calling 334-5878, the Office for Sponsored Programs. 
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Appendix K 
Text used in the distractor task 
Once on the long covered piers, you have come into a 
ghostly country that is no longer Here and yet not There. 
Especially at night. There is a hazy yellow vault full of 
shouting, echoing voices. There is the rumble of trucks and 
the clump of trunks, the strident chatter of a crane and the 
first salt smell of the sea. You hurry through, even though 
there's time. The past, the continent, is behind you; the 
future is that glowing mouth in the side of the ship; this 





I'd like to thank you for your participation and 
mention again that all information you've given me today is 
confidential. I'd also like to tell you a bit about what 
I'm studying in this experiment. What I'm really interested 
in is the relationship between mood and memory for positive 
and negative information. Since I am in interested in mood, 
I asked you to fill out two questionnaires that measure 
mood. I also asked you a list of questions concerned with 
how you've been feeling. 
Previous research has shown that when people feel sad 
or blue, they often remember bad or negative things. Have 
you noticed that in yourself? I know I have. Research in 
this area generally has used memory tasks like free recall. 
Participants study a list of words and then are explicitly 
asked to recall the list. 
Cued recall condition: 
That's what I asked you to do and gave you word 





When recall tests are used, people who feel sad or blue 
usually remember more negatively toned words while people 
who are feeling happier tend to remember more positively 
toned words. Half the folks in this experiment were given a 
recall test and given word fragments to use as cues to help 
remember the rating words. The other folks were given an 
implicit or indirect test. Those folks were given word 
fragments, but were not told to try to remember the list. 
Instead, they were told to complete the fragments with the 
first words that came to mind. 
Fragment completion condition: 
That's what you were asked to do today. 
All subjects: 
What I think will happen is that mood state won't have 
an effect on that type of test. I also asked people to 
circle the words they remembered from the rating task after 
they completed the fragments. I wanted to see how well 
people could remember the words. This research could be 
important in helping us understand states like depression, 




Introductory psychology subjects: 
I'd also like to ask that you not discuss the details 
of the experiment with your friends. Other people will be 
participating and I'm sure that you can see that if people 
knew what to expect, their reactions wouldn't be natural. 
(Credit slips were then given out.) Thanks again. 
Community volunteers: 
Thanks again for your help. (All subjects were then 
paid fifteen dollars. Subjects who were not currently 
receiving treatment were referred to the UNCG Psychology 
Clinic, UNCG Counseling Center, and Guilford County Mental 
Health Services.) 
